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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK and 4 44 7 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah General 
Partnership, by and through its 
General Partner, ROBERT D. KENT, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION, a 
Utah Corporation; BERTAGNOLE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah Limited 
Partnership; FAUST LAND, INC. , a 
Utah Corporation; JOSEPH L. PENTZ; 
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN; RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 90391 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah 
Constitution Art. VIII, § 3; Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(j) (Repl. 
Vol. 1987); and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. 
Did the lower court properly hold that Overthrust Oil & 
Gas Corporation was not an accommodation party to the $1 million 
note executed by Capitol Thrift & Loan Company? This issue is a 
mixed question of fact and law. The question whether Overthrust 
was an accommodation party is an issue of fact (since it depends 
on the intent of the parties) and this Court should defer to the 
finding of the trial court unless the finding was clearly 
erroneous as against the clear weight of the evidence. Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). The issue whether, as 
a matter of law, a trustor of a trust deed can be an 
accommodation party to the maker of the underlying instrument is 
an issue of law and this Court need accord no deference to the 
ruling of the lower court, but should review it for correctness. 
Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P. 2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989). 
II. 
Did the lower court properly dismiss appellants' cross-
claim against Richard A. Christenson? This is an issue is a 
mixed question of law and fact, governed by the standard set 
forth in the previous paragraph. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal by Overthrust Oil & Gas Corporation 
and Faust Land, Inc., from a judgment of the lower court entered 
on March 30, 1990, dismissing their cross-claims against Richard 
A. Christenson with prejudice and on the merits. (R. 441. ) 
B. QJSPQSition gf thq Cage Belgw. 
The action was tried before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, of the Third Judicial District Court for Tooele 
County, on August 31, 1989. Following the trial, the Court made 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law orally on the record. 
(Transcript of Memorandum Decision, September 7, 1989.) The 
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court entered written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
October 23, 1989. (R. 339-48. ) Following objections from 
appellants, the court entered Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on December 29, 1989. (R. 401-06). After 
hearing further objections from appellants, the court entered 
Superseding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 423-37) 
together with a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (R. 438-44) on 
March 30, 1989. Appellants have appealed from the Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure entered March 30, 1989. (R. 473-74. ) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Zions First National Bank made a loan to Capitol Thrift 
& Loan Company ("Capitol Thrift") on September 28, 1984, for 
$1,000,000.00 (the "$1 million note"). The loan was guaranteed 
by defendant Richard A. Christenson ("Christenson"). In 
connection with the restructuring of all of the indebtedness owed 
by Capitol Thrift and others to plaintiffs, on May 26, 1986, 
Overthrust Oil & Gas Corporation ("Overthrust") executed a Trust 
Deed as additional security for the loan on approximately 3, 500 
acres of property located in Tooele County. (Finding of Fact No. 
4, R. 434. ) 
On September 30, 1987, plaintiffs Zions First National 
Bank and 4447 Associates entered into an Agreement with defendant 
Richard A. Christenson ("Christenson") and other parties by which 
certain obligations owed to plaintiffs were settled and released. 
-3-
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The obligations that were released included the $1 million note 
executed by Capitol Thrift & Loan Company. (Finding of Fact No. 
12, R. 433; Exhibit D-4. ) 
Plaintiffs subsequently commenced this action to 
foreclose the Trust Deed. Overthrust and Faust Land, Inc. 
("Faust Land") in turn filed a cross-claim against Christenson 
seeking a judgment against him for the value of the property that 
was the subject of the Trust Deed. (R. 204. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Appellants' brief fails to contain any argument 
that the lower court committed error in dismissing the cross-
claim against Richard A. Christenson. Although they conclude 
their brief with a request that this Court order that Christenson 
is liable, appellants have not articulated their legal argument 
and have not cited this Court to those portions of the record 
that support their position. Appellants' brief violates Rule 
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
2. The lower court properly found that Overthrust was 
not an accommodation party. That issue is an issue of fact and 
depends on the intent of the parties. Appellants failed to 
marshal the evidence against the court' s finding and failed to 
show that that finding was against the clear weight of the 
evidence. In addition, the lower court' s ruling was correct as a 
matter of law. A trustor of a trust deed is not an accommodation 
-4-
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party within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415(l) (Repl 
Vol. 19 90) • . •' •. r-ror, did not sign an 
"instrument" ^ * 'ri.: = cefined in the Uniform Commercial 
Code, nor d i d it lend i ts name to * - %aker ~;f :r.e note Tapitol 
Thri ft & I ioai 1 Compai iy Pi na 1 ] y 0" - • - : • * - • . 
sue Christenson (or Zions and 4447 .ss-^ic^s for mat :.atit: 
because it ] ack standing, having conveyed * -1 Tooele property 
prior to the entry of the judgment ; - . . . ' i 
evidence that Overthrust was damaged i •: any cr/ r:y zhe 
foreclosure of the property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANTS7 BRIEF DOES NOT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE 
THE BASIS FOR THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT ERRED 
IN DISMISSING THE COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CHRISTENSON. 
In the conclusion to their brief on appeal, Overthrust 
and F ' a u s 1: I i a i i c:i a s k 11: :n :ii s C o i i i: t: t o r e v e r s e t h e 11: i a ] c o u i: t: a i i d t: o 
order that judgment should be entered against Christenson for the 
value of '.::>- mineral n g n t s 1 sr and for the value of the Tooele 
Property ""'" - ::n not. howe' ••;:, - - ,.. - i n tl: le basi s f :: i: thei r 
position ni'v understandable fashion. Nowhere in their brief 
{,, Hlf,y -, -. - \ unristenson should be liable to them, and 
Christenson ^s a\ =» loss i n knowing how to respond to their 
claims. Appellants had t h e s a in e difficulty during the t r i a 1 o f 
Appellants' brief, at 3 7 
_ c 
c: \ W D I \ 0 8 8 \ 0 0 0 0 0 D 4 4 . W 5 1 
this action in articulating the legal basis for their claim that 
they were somehow entitled to a judgment against Christenson. 
In Point VIII of their brief, which appears to be the 
only point that might possibly relate to Christenson, they argue 
that they were accommodation parties, but fail to describe the 
legal significance of that assertion as it relates to their 
claims against Christenson. Their scattered and disorganized 
argument lends no support to their contention that the lower 
court committed error in dismissing the cross-claim against 
Christenson. 2 
If Overthrust and Faust Land believe that Christenson 
is liable on a theory of subrogation or for contribution, they 
have failed to make their argument in terms that can be 
understood and responded to. Not once in their brief do they 
direct this Court to legal authorities or to references in the 
record that support their untenable position, and Christenson is 
left to hazard guesses regarding the legal basis of their claims. 
2
 Point VIII of the brief filed by Overthrust and Faust 
Land was virtually unintelligible, containing sentences without 
verbs and paragraphs that seem entirely meaningless. In Point VIII 
they argue consecutively that they were accommodation parties; that 
plaintiffs "ought to be estopped" from foreclosing; that an accord 
and satisfaction was reached between plaintiffs, Capitol, and 
Christenson; and that the debt secured by the Trust Deed was 
extinguished. (Appellants' brief, at 32-35.) Appellants do not 
explain the relationship between these various issues, nor do they 
state whether these issues have any significance to the question of 
Christenson' s alleged liability. Their argument contains 
practically no citations to legal authority or to the record and is 
impossible for Christenson to respond to adequately. 
-6-
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Their appeal as against Christenson shoul< 1 be dismissed for 
.-- - - - - - . ^ 4(a;(9)/ Utah Rules of Aore'.ate 
Procedure -::;.<:;; provides t.-is*- the argument section ;;
 s 
"shall contain the contentions and reasons :-f the appellant with 
res pec t: t :: -• - •" • . •
 : • . ....^  
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on,"j 
11. 
NEITHER OVERTHRUST NOR FAUST LAND WAS AN 
ACCOMMODATION PARTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH 
CODE ANN, § 70A-3-606. 
A. Overthrust and Faust Land have not met their 
burden of showing that the lower court/ s 
finding of fact that they are not 
accommodation parties is clearly erroneous. 
./. Point "111 •. , . : or.e: Overthrust, and Faust Land 
assert that they arp accommodate en :„ a. ' : es "entitled to the 
benefits" of tlK * * - -• § 
70A-3-606 (Repl. Vc- I-9-. • Although they 10 r.c L aes:r::,r • ..n 
"benefits" to wh:.r- ••-•$*• c-Laj.«i ent -i^-e^ -o*-- -r^s~ ^nj Faust 
Land apparently oe. ., -. • ~ -..hat thei: . * *- * ~ - i 
parties gives their* nights against v.r.nstensc* t: * :.t extent that 
they have suffered a IOSS or uhe Tooele property. The law does 
3
 Rule 24(k), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides 
further that briefs that do not comply with the rule "may be 
disregarded or stricken. " The Court also has the discretion to 
award attorneys' fees under that rule. Christens on urges the Court 
to disregard or strike appellants' brief and to award him a 
reasonable attorneys' fee incurred in defending th :i s appeal 
4
 Appellants' brief, at 3 2, 
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not support their position and this Court should affirm the trial 
court7 s dismissal of the cross-claim against Christenson. 
The lower court held that "Overthrust was not an 
accommodation party in connection with the third loan of 
September 28, 1984, as the term accommodation party is used in 
the statutes of the State of Utah. ,f (Conclusion of Law No. 8, R. 
427. ) 5 Whether Overthrust was an accommodation party is an 
issue of fact because it depends on the intent of the parties. 
According to this Court in Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association v. Watts. 737 P. 2d 154 (Utah 1987), 
[w]hether a person is an accommodation party 
is a question of intent. In other words, it 
is a question of the intention of the person 
claimed to be an accommodation party, the 
person who would be the accommodated party, 
and the person who was the holder of the 
paper when the alleged accommodation party 
signed. 
Id. at 158 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).5 See 
Moonev v. GR and Associates, 746 P. 2d 1174, 1177 (Utah App. 
1987). 
5
 The lower court' s holding is in reality a finding of fact 
and this Court should not accord it any less deference simply 
because it was denominated a conclusion of law. See e. a. , State v. 
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd. , 786 P. 2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). 
6
 In their brief, Overthrust and Faust Land cite the Utah 
Farm Production Credit case, noting that the Court held that 
"whether or not a signor does so as an accommodation is a question 
of intent. " (Appellants' brief, at 3 3. ) Although they acknowledge 
this rule, appellants failed at trial to introduce any evidence 
relating to the intent of the parties. Certainly, they have failed 
to marshal any evidence in their brief on appeal. 
-8-
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In Utah Farm Production Credit Association, this Court 
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the alleged accommodation 
parties on the grounds that issues of fact had been raised 
regarding the intent of the parties. Construing the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-4157 this Court described the factors 
to be considered in determining whether a person is an 
accommodation party, including whether the party received any 
benefit from signing the instrument and "whether the signature of 
the person claiming to be an accommodation party was necessary 
for the other party to receive the consideration given in 
exchange for the note." I^L. at 159 (footnote omitted). 
There was no evidence in the present case that the 
parties intended that Overthrust would be an accommodation party 
when it executed the Trust Deed. There was no evidence, for 
example, that the delivery of the Trust Deed was essential in 
order for Capitol Thrift to receive the consideration given for 
the $1 million note. Indeed, this could not have been the case 
since the note was made in 1984 and the Trust Deed in 1986. 
(Finding of Fact No. 4, R. 434. ) 
Section 3-415(1) of the UCC defines an accommodation 
party as follows: 
An accommodation party is one who signs the 
instrument in any capacity for the purpose of 
lending his name to another party to it. 
-9-
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Because the finding that Overthrust was not an 
accommodation party is one of fact, appellants had the duty in 
their brief to marshal the evidence supporting the findings and 
then demonstrate that, even if viewed in the light most favorable 
to the trial court, the evidence insufficient to support the 
findings. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). 
Their brief does not contain any references to the record 
demonstrating that the lower court7 s finding was against the 
clear weight of the evidence. Overthrust had the burden at the 
trial of demonstrating that it was an accommodation party. Utah 
Farm Production Credit Association v. Watts, 737 P. 2d at 158-59. 
Appellants failed in that burden. They failed to introduce the 
necessary evidence of the parties' intent at the trial and failed 
to marshal any evidence whatsoever in support of their position 
in their brief on appeal. This Court should affirm the trial 
court' s holding that Overthrust was not an accommodation party. 
B. As a matter of law, a party who signs a trust 
deed can not be an accommodation party to the 
maker of a promissory note. 
Appellants' appeal should also fail on the additional 
ground that Overthrust, as the trustor of the Trust Deed, cannot 
be an accommodation maker as a matter of law. An accommodation 
party, according to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415(1), "is one who 
signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending 
his name to another party to it. " (Emphasis added. ) Thus, 
• -10-
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Overthrust could only be an accommodation party if it signed an 
"instrument" for the purpose of lending its name to another party 
to the instrument. The UCC defines "instrument" as meaning "a 
negotiable instrument." Utah Code Ann. 70A-3-102(1)(e). Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-3-104 describes the requisites of negotiable 
instruments, which are limited to drafts, checks, certificates of 
deposit, and notes. I 
A trust deed is not an "instrument" within the meaning 
of Section 3-415(1). A trust deed is nothing more than a means 
of pledging real property to secure a debt. It does not, by 
itself, obligate the trustor to make payments and does not render 
the trustor liable in the event that the underlying obligation 
goes into default. By signing the Trust Deed in the present 
case, Overthrust did not become obligated to Zions First National 
Bank in any way. According to the Official Comment to Section 3-
415(1), | 
Subsection (1) recognizes that an 
accommodation party is always a surety (which 
includes a guarantor), and it is his only 
distinguishing feature. He differs from 
other sureties only in that his liability is 
on the instrument and he is a surety for 
another party to it. . . . An accommodation 
maker or acceptor is bound on the instrument 
without any resort to his principal . . . . 
Official Comment 1 (Emphasis added. )8 
8
 In Official Comment 2, the drafters of the UCC stated 
further that " [t]he essential characteristic is that the 
(continued. . . ) 
-11-
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Overthrust was not a surety of the debt that Capitol 
Thrift owed to Zions First National Bank. After it conveyed the 
property, Overthrust had no further connection with the 
transaction and owed no debt to the bank. If Overthrust was not 
a surety, it could not have been an accommodation party. Mere 
execution of the Trust Deed for the purpose of pledging property 
to secure the debt does not make Overthrust a surety of the debt. 
Because Overthrust did not sign or guarantee payment of the note, 
it is not an accommodation party. 
This legal principal is supported by a careful reading 
of Section 3-415(1), which provides that the accommodation party 
must sign the same instrument as the person being accommodated. 
The statute states that an accommodation party "is one who signs 
the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his 
name to another party to it. " (Emphasis added. ) In the present 
case, Overthrust did not sign the $1 million note and did not, in 
any way, lend its name to Capitol Thrift7 s name. By signing the 
Trust Deed two years after the note was executed, Overthrust 
hardly became an accommodation party to the original note. If it 
was not an accommodation party, then it is not entitled to claim 
that it is somehow entitled to contribution from Christenson 
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606(l) or any other provision of 
8(. . . continued) 




law. 9 According to White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 
13-15, at 665 (1988 ed. ), Section 3-606 applies only to "any 
party to an instrument. " Overthrust was not a party to the note 
and was not obligated under the note in any way. 
C. Overthrust has no standing to sue since it 
conveyed the property before the judgment of 
foreclosure was entered. 
Overthrust has no standing to sue for the loss of the 
Tooele property, since it conveyed the property to Faust Land 
after executing the Trust Deed. (Finding of Fact No. 10, R. 
433. ) Faust Land was clearly not an accommodation party, since 
it did not sign anything and did not lend its name to Capitol 
Thrift. Overthrust appears to be claiming that it is entitled to 
a judgment against Christenson for the loss of the Tooele 
property even though it no longer owned the property at the time 
the judgment of foreclosure was entered. Overthrust could not 
have suffered the loss of the property. 
Overthrust introduced no evidence regarding the terms 
of the conveyance to Faust Land and did not argue to the court 
below that it suffered a loss because of the encumbrance created 
y
 As argued in Point I of this brief above, appellants' 
brief contains no argument relating to their claims against 
Christenson. Christenson' s argument herein represents his best 
effort to understand their claims against him and to respond in a 
way that will be helpful to the Court. Without a better 
understanding of the nature of appellants' claims, however, he is 




by the recording of the Trust Deed. Faust Land took the property 
subject to the recorded trust deed lien and is in no position to 
claim that it suffered a loss because of the encumbrance on the 
property at the time of the conveyance. Overthrust has no 
standing to sue for value of the property if it no longer owns 
the property. Faust Land is similarly in an unavailing position, 
s:nce it took the property subject to the recorded lien. 
CONCLUSION 
In their brief, appellants failed to set forth any 
understandable legal argument supporting their position against 
Christenson. The lower court' s finding that Overthrust was not 
an accommodation party was justified by Overthrust' s failure to 
introduce evidence relating to the intent of the parties at the 
time the note was executed. Moreover, as a matter of law 
Overthrust, as the trustor of the Trust Deed, could not have been 
an accommodation party within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-3-415(l) since a trust deed is not an "instrument" as defined 
in the Uniform Commercial Code. Christenson urges this Court to 
affirm the lower court' s dismissal of the cross-claim against 
him. 
ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto are the following documents: 
1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
2. Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. 
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DATED this / 1 day of January, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By 01 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Attorneys for defendant/appellee 
Richard A. Christenson 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Richard A. 
Christenson to be mailed, postage prepaid, this l ; day of 
January, 1991, to the following: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Allen, Nelson, Hardy & Evans 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lorin N. Pace 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1200 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH i 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK and 
4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah General 
Partnership, by and through its 
General Partner, ROBERT D. KENT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION 
a Utah Corporation; BERTAGNOLE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah Limited 
Partnership; FAUST LAND, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; JOSEPH L. PENTZ; 
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN; RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON, JOHN DOES 1 thru 100 
and any and all persons who may 
claim any right, title or interest 
in and to the property which is 
the subject of this action, 
Defendants, 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION 
a Utah Corporation, and FAUST 
LAND, a Utah Corporation, 
Cross Claim Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITOL THRIFT & loan, a Utah 
Corporation, and RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON, an individual, 
Cross Claim Defendants. 
SUPERSEDING 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 88-087 
The above-referenced matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of the above-entitled Court, 
on Thursday, August 31, 1989. Plaintiffs were represented by their 
counsel, Bruce J. Nelson, Esq., of the law firm of Allen Nelson 
Hardy & Evans. Defendants Overthrust Oil & Gas Company and Faust 
Land, Inc., were represented by their counsel, Lorin N. Pace, Esq. 
Defendants Capitol Thrift & Loan and Richard Christenson were 
represented by their counsel, R. Stephen Marshall, Esq., of the 
law firm of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. The Court 
considered the evidence submitted at trial, heard the testimony of 
witnesses, considered the exhibits offered into evidence, 
considered the various stipulations of counsel, the arguments 
presented at trial, and miscellaneous memoranda and briefs 
submitted concurrently therewith. 
Subsequent to trial held on August 31, 1989, this Court made 
previous Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which were 
executed by the Court on October 23, 1989. Such Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law delayed for future determination the issue 
of the amount of "boot" to be credited to the Promissory Note which 
is the subject of this action. Pursuant to hearing on Monday, 
November 13, 1989, the Court considered such issue. At such 
hearing, the Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel Bruce J. 
Nelson, Esq. Defendants Overthrust Oil and Gas Corporation and 
Faust Land, Inc., were represented by their counsel Lorin N. Pace, 
Esq. The Court made certain rulings following the conclusion of 
counsels' argument at such hearing. Subsequently, counsel for the 
Plaintiff submitted proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to which objections were made by counsel for 
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Defendants Overthrust and Faust Land, Inc. A hearing on such 
objections was held by the Court on February 8, 1990. Bruce J. 
Nelson, Esq., was present representing the Plaintiffs. Lorin N. 
Pace, Esq., was present representing Defendants Overthrust and 
Faust Land, Inc. R. Stephen Marshall, Esq., was present 
representing Crossclaim Defendants Capitol Thrift & Loan and 
Richard A. Christenson. At such hearing, the Court considered the 
written objections and arguments of counsel, and the Court, having 
reviewed the pleadings, documents, and exhibits on file herein, 
made certain rulings relating to amendment of the original Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the proposed Supplemental Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the written objections thereto. 
Pursuant to such ruling, the Court now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which are 
intended to supersede any previous Findings and Conclusions 
previously executed by the Court or submitted by the parties for 
consideration by the Court. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In early 1983, Zions First National Bank advanced the 
first of a series of large loans, principally arranged through 
Defendant Richard A. Christenson and affiliates of Bertagnole 
Properties, a Utah partnership. 
2. The first loan advanced by Plaintiff Zions First National 
Bank was made on March 13, 1983, in the amount of $3,015,000.00 to 
Defendant Bertagnole Investment Company Limited Partnership, 
Defendant Richard A. Christenson, an entity known as Franklin 
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Financial, and a Utah limited partnership known as Bertagnole 
Properties. 
3. The second loan advanced by Plaintiff Zions First 
National Bank was made on June 8, 1984, in the amount of 
$1,389,418.76 to Defendant Bertagnole Investment Company Limited 
Partnership, and a Utah limited partnership known as Bertagnole 
Properties. 
4. A third loan, which is the subject of this action, was 
made by Plaintiff Zions First National Bank on September 28, 1984, 
to Defendant Capitol Thrift & Loan Company in the amount of 
$1,000,000.00 (hereinafter "note"). Such loan was a renewal of 
prior loans to Defendant Capitol. Such loan was guaranteed by 
Defendant Richard A. Christenson. The loan was subsequently 
secured by a Trust Deed dated May 26, 1986, on approximately 3,500 
acres of undeveloped real property located in Tooele County, State 
of Utah (hereinafter "Tooele Property11) . The loan was further 
secured by an interest in property known as the Section 3 5 Property 
located in Summit County, and also by a pledge of receivables 
formerly owed to Richard A. Christenson, Bruce L. Moesser and 
Capitol Thrift & Loan Company (hereinafter "First Security Bank 
receivables"). 
5. Neither Overthrust nor Faust Land, Inc., were makers on 
any of the notes to Plaintiff Zions. 
6. As the time of such pledge of property, principals of 
Defendant Bertagnole Investment Company Limited Partnership 
controlled approximately 80% of Defendant Overthrust Oil & Gas 
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Company Stock. Owners of Defendant Overthrust Oil & Gas Company 
were substantially similar to owners of Defendant Bertagnole 
Investment Company Limited Partnership and Bertagnole Properties, 
7. The Bertagnole partnerships and members of the Bertagnole 
family also held substantial interests in Defendant Capitol Thrift 
& Loan Company. 
8. Each of the three above-described loans subsequently 
became in default. 
9. 4447 Associates, a Utah partnership, has acquired a 
participation interest in and to Plaintiff Zions First National 
Bank's interest to such three Promissory Notes. 
10. Subsequent to the execution of the above-described Trust 
Deed, Defendant Overthrust conveyed title to the Tooele Property 
to Defendant Faust Land, Inc. Defendant Faust is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Defendant Overthrust. 
11. Subsequent to the default on the Notes, Plaintiffs Zions 
First National Bank and 4447 Associates engaged in extended 
settlement negotiations with the obligors on such Notes. 
12. On September 30, 1987, following the settlement 
negotiations, the Plaintiffs and the obligors under the three 
Promissory Notes executed a Settlement Agreement. Such Agreement 
was executed between the Plaintiffs, Bertagnole Investment Company 
Limited Partnership, Bertagnole Properties, several individuals 
from the Bertagnole family, Emanuel A. Floor, and Richard A. 
Christenson. The Settlement Agreement contemplated the foreclosure 
of various parcels of property securing the three Notes, as well 
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as the payment of certain "boot" by the obligors under such Notes, 
all in exchange for a contemplated release of liability to the 
obligors on such Notes. 
13. Defendants Overthrust and Faust Land, Inc., were not 
parties to the September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement. 
14. The following "boot" was given to Plaintiffs by one or 
more of the note obligors or guarantors at or about the time of the 
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement: 
a. 10,000,000 shares of restricted stock in Defendant 
Overthrust Oil & Gas Company. The stock was subject to an 
option to repurchase for ten cents (100) per share before 
September 30, 1993; 
b. Release of a $40,000 First Trust Deed having 
priority to the interest of the Plaintiffs in Section 3 5 in 
Summit County; 
c. Certain property to be contributed by Richard A. 
Christenson, known as the Deer Hollow Property, consisting of 
approximately 160 acres of undeveloped real property located 
in Morgan County, State of Utah; 
d. A two-thirds interest in 10 acres of real property 
located in Davis county, State of Utah, known as the Redwood 
Road Property; and 
e. Certain mineral rights associated with other Summit 
County property known as the North Park Property. 
No attempt was made in the September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement 
to allocate the boot specifically to any of the three delinquent 
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notes, but was intermingled and credited to the total value of all 
three notes. 
15. George Woodhead served as President of Defendant 
Overthrust during the periods of time relevant to negotiations and 
execution of the Settlement Agreement. Mr. Woodhead was involved 
in the negotiations of the Agreement and had full knowledge of the 
terms and contents thereof. Mr. Woodhead also had knowledge of the 
implications which would follow the execution of the Settlement 
Agreement. 
16. Subsequent to the execution of the Settlement Agreement 
but prior to the scheduled foreclosure sales contemplated therein, 
it was determined by the parties to such Agreement that the Tooele 
County Property, which is the subject of this lawsuit, could not 
be foreclosed in the Bankruptcy Court as contemplated under the 
Settlement Agreement. 
17. After a discussion of options available to effectuate the 
intent of the Settlement Agreement without the contemplated 
bankruptcy sale of the Tooele County Property, George Woodhead, as 
President of Defendant Overthrust Oil & Gas Company, agreed to 
convey the Tooele County Property to the Plaintiffs pursuant to the 
Agreement. He agreed to get permission from the Board of Directors 
of Overthrust to convey the property. No deed was ever given. 
18. Mr. Woodhead subsequently suggested to counsel for the 
Plaintiffs that the Plaintiffs should file a friendly foreclosure 
suit with the intent being that Defendant Overthrust would not 
contest the suit. 
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19. George Woodhead's actions, in indicating a deed would be 
executed or in suggesting a friendly foreclosure which would not 
be contested, were outside the authority which he had as president 
of the corporation and were not binding upon Defendants Overthrust 
and Faust Land, Inc. 
20. The amount owing on the third Note referenced in 
paragraph 4 above, as of August 31, 1989, was the sum of 
$1,461,226.70, without deduction for boot settlement amounts and 
unearned interest on amounts ruled by the Court to have been paid 
on September 30, 1987. 
21. The fair market value of the Tooele Property, pursuant 
to testimony of George Woodhead, is $410,000.00. 
22. Plaintiffs have filed a lawsuit against First Security 
Bank to seek collection of the First Security Bank receivables but 
have not collected any funds from such suit. First Security Bank 
is contesting any liability in such action. 
23. The interest pledged to the Plaintiffs in the Section 35 
property had a value of $79,200.00 at the time of the September 30, 
1987, Settlement Agreement. 
24. The Shirley Thorpe Trust Deed on the Section 35 property, 
which Trust Deed was released at or about the time of the 
September 30, 1987, Agreement, had a value to Plaintiff's interest 
in the amount of $21,200.00. 
25. Based upon testimony received at trial, the Court finds 
the value of the mineral rights in Summit County to have been the 
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sum of $450,000.00, as of the date of the September 1987 Settlement 
Agreement. 
26. The Court finds the value of the Deer Hollow Property to 
have been the sum of $200,000.00 at or about the time of the 
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement. 
27. The Court finds the value of the Redwood Road Property 
to have been the sum of 155,000.00 at or about the time of the 
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement. 
28. Pursuant to testimony given at trial, the Court concludes 
that the value of the 10,000,000 shares of Overthrust Oil & Gas 
Company stock, as of the date of September 1987, was the sum of 
$250,000.00. 
29. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of 
legal counsel to foreclose the property which is the subject of 
this action. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. The September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement was and is 
a valid and binding agreement. 
2. Failure of the Plaintiffs to be allowed to foreclose 
against the Tooele Property presently owned by Defendant Faust 
Land, Inc., would have constituted a failure of consideration of 
the September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement. 
3. The Plaintiffs would be estopped from setting aside the 
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement based on the fact that 
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approximately two years have elapsed since its execution, and the 
Plaintiffs have elected to treat it as a valid agreement, have 
filed the instant action of foreclosure and undertaken other action 
to collect receivables against First Security Bank, and have not 
given any notice to set aside such Agreement. 
4. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement of 
September 30, 1987, Defendants Capitol Thrift & Loan and Richard A. 
Christenson have been released from liability on the three loans 
of Zions First National Bank described in the above Findings of 
Fact in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 thereof. 
5. George Woodhead, as President of Defendant Overthrust, 
did not have authority to bind the Defendant Overthrust in 
connection with his agreements to convey title to the Tooele County 
Property to the Plaintiffs or to suggest an uncontested friendly 
foreclosure of such property. George Woodheadfs actions after the 
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement were outside his authority 
as president of Overthrust and are not binding on the corporation. 
6. The Trust Deed on the Tooele County Property, dated 
May 20, 1986, and recorded in the office of the Tooele County 
Recorder on May 21, 1986, is a valid and binding Trust Deed 
supported by adequate consideration of the September 28, 1984, loan 
by Plaintiff Zions First National Bank. 
7. Defendant Overthrust received a benefit from the granting 
of the Trust Deed by virtue of the fact that the Bertagnole 
Partnerships and family members owned a majority of the stock of 
Defendant Overthrust. 
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8. Defendant Overthrust was not an accommodation party in 
connection with the third loan of September 28, 1984, as the term 
accommodation party is used in the statutes of the State of Utah. 
9. The Tooele property Trust Deed should be foreclosed in 
the same manner as a mortgage to satisfy the unpaid obligations of 
the September 28, 1984 loan. The interests in the Tooele Property 
of all Defendants are subordinate to the Trust Deed interest of 
the Plaintiffs. There should be no right to a deficiency judgment 
against the Defendants following foreclosure of the Trust Deed. 
10. The unpaid amount of the loan should be reduced by the 
value of the Section 35 property as set forth herein, the value of 
the Shirley Thorpe First Trust Deed on such property as set forth 
herein, as well as the value of any other "boot" received at the 
time of the Settlement Agreement. 
11. The combination of the value of the Section 3 5 property 
($79,200.00) and the value of the released Shirley Thorpe Trust 
Deed ($21,200.00), being a total of $100,400.00, should be credited 
directly to the amount owing on the Promissory Note. 
12. Inasmuch as the Settlement Agreement treated all "boot" 
received towards the three outstanding loans owed by people 
affiliated with the Bertagnole Family, it is impossible to 
determine with exactness what boot should be applied to which of 
the three loans. The Court determines that the parties must have 
intended a pro rata application of the boot. The obligation owing 
on the loan which is the subject of this lawsuit constituted 19.79% 
of the total obligation of all three loans. As a result, 19.79% 
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of th i value of the remaining "boot" should also be applied to the 
amount owing on the Note which is the subject of this lawsuit. 
13. The value of the remaining "boot" is: 
a. Summit County water and 
mineral rights $ 450,000.00 
b. Deer Hollow Property 200,000.00 
c. Redwood Road Property 155,000.00 
d. Overthrust Stock 250,000.00 
TOTAL $1,055,000.00 
As a result, the sum of $208,784.50, constituting 19.79% of the 
above total, should be credited to the amount owing on the 
Promissory Note which is the subject of this action. 
14. In summary, the following amounts should be credited to 
the Promissory Note which is the subject of this action. 
a. Amount owing as of date of trial $1,461,000.00 
b. Less Section 35 and 
Shirley Thorpe credits [100,100.001 
SUBTOTAL $1,360,900.00 
c. Less pro rata credit from 
remaining "boot" f^08,784.501 
TOTAL AMOUNT OWING 
(as of date of trial) $1,152,115.50 
15. Interest on the foregoing amount should accrue at the 
judgment rate of 12% per annum from and after August 31, 1989. 
16. In addition to the foregoing, the Plaintiffs should be 
required to give credit on the Note which is the subject of this 
action, any amounts received from the pending First Security Bank 
lawsuit. Plaintiffs should be required to pursue such lawsuit in 
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good faith and are entitled to pursue the same either through 
trial or settlement as they deem appropriate, 
17. Release of the obligors1 liability on the note did not 
satisfy the unpaid note, nor release the Trust Deed on the Tooele 
Property, because the September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement 
clearly contemplated such result. 
18. The action of filing the lawsuit by Plaintiffs to 
liquidate the First Security receivables has not extinguished the 
amount owing on the note. 
19. Defendants Overthrust and Faust Land, Inc., have a right 
of subrogation against Capitol Thrift & Loan to the extent 
Defendant Overthrust has shown it would be damaged by the expected 
foreclosure as may be subsequently determined by the Court. 
Defendant Overthrust has no right of subrogation against Defendant 
Christenson. Defendant Overthrustfs Crossclaim against Defendant 
Christenson should be dismissed. After completion of the 
foreclosure, Defendants Overthrust and Faust may petition this 
Court for an additional hearing on damages. Such Defendants1 
claim for attorneys fees may be determined and considered at such 
later hearing. 
20. Bertagnole, Capitol Thrift & Loan, and Overthrust were 
all separate entities and were not agents of each other. 
21. The foreclosure of the Tooele Property should not be 
delayed pending a completion of the lawsuit against First Security 
Bank. 
22. This Court should enter a Decree of Foreclosure 
authorizing the Sheriff of Tooele County to proceed with a 
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Sheriff fs Sale, in accordance with the law and practice of this 
Court and the statutes of the State of Utah, of the real property 
located in Tooele County which is the subject of this action. Any 
amount received at the sale, or the amount of any final credit bid 
by the Plaintiffs, should reduce the amount owing on the Note as 
set forth in paragraph 4 above. 
23. However, any monies received from the net receivables in 
the First Security Bank lawsuit (after crediting litigation costs, 
fees and expenses) should also be applied to any residual amount 
owing on the Note which is the subject of this action. In the 
event net receivables create a surplus over and above any 
remaining amount owing on the Note, the same shall be tendered 
into Court and any parties who may claim an interest in and to 
such surplus may seek appropriate legal relief to obtain any 
amounts to which they may be properly entitled. 
24. In addition to the amounts owing on the note as set 
forth above, Plaintiffs are entitled to an attorneys fee in this 
matter in the amount of $5,000.00. 
DATED this J ° day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
HoSerF.Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
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APPRC !D AS TO FORM: 
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Brkce J. Nelson, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Lorin N. Pace, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Overthrust 
and Faust Land, Inc. 
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R. Stephjpn Marshall, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
Capitol Thrift & Loan and 




'-•" v.x : o 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
9 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK and 
44 47 ASSOCIATES, a Utah General 
Partnership, by and through its 
General Partner, ROBERT D. KENT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION 
a Utah Corporation; BERTAGNOLE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah Limited 
Partnership; FAUST LAND, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; JOSEPH L. PENTZ; 
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN; RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON, JOHN DOES 1 thru 100 
and any and all persons who may 
claim any right, title or interest 
in and to the property which is 
the subject of this action, 
Defendants, 
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION 
a Utah Corporation, and FAUST 
LAND, a Utah Corporation, 
Cross Claim Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN, a Utah 
Corporation, and RICHARD A. 
CHRISTENSON, an individual, 
Cross Claim Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF FORECLOSURE 
M % 2% % % 'I 
Civil No. 88-087 
The above-referenced matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of the above-entitled Court, 
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on Thursday, August 31, 1989. Plaintiffs were represented by their 
counsel, Bruce J. Nelson, Esq., of the law firm of Allen Nelson 
Hardy & Evans. Defendants Overthrust Oil & Gas Company and Faust 
Land, Inc., were represented by their counsel, Lorin N. Pace, Esq. 
Defendants Capitol Thrift & Loan and Richard Christensen were 
represented by their counsel, R. Stephen Marshall, Esq., of the 
law firm of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. The Court, 
having listened to the evidence submitted at trial, having heard 
the testimony of witnesses and considered the exhibits offered into 
evidence, and the Court having considered the various stipulations 
of counsel, arguments presented at trial, and miscellaneous 
memoranda and briefs submitted concurrently therewith, and the 
Court having previously entered its Superseding Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and the Court being thereby fully advised 
in the premises, and good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The real property located in Tooele County, Utah, more 
particularly described on the attached Exhibit "A", is security 
under a Trust Deed dated May 20, 1986, for an unpaid debt owed to 
the Plaintiffs in the amount of $1,157,115.50 as of August 31, 
1989, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of 12% per 
annum, with a per diem of $380.42. Such amount consists of unpaid 
principal, accrued interest, an attorneys fee of $5,000.00, and a 
credit for payments applied to such loan in connection with a 
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement. 
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2. The foregoing described property, or such portion thereof 
as may be sufficient to pay the foregoing amounts and the accruing 
costs herein and expenses of sale, shall be sold at public auction 
by the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, in the manner 
prescribed by law for the foreclosure of mortgages. The Sheriff, 
out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs, 
disbursements, and commissions, and then pay to Plaintiffs, or to 
their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, 
then the amount owing to Plaintiffs for principal, interest, and 
costs, or so much of such sums as such proceeds will pay, and the 
surplus, if any, shall be accounted for and paid over to the Clerk 
of this Court subject to this Court's further order. 
3. The interest of all Defendants are subordinate to the 
interest of the Plaintiffs in the property subject to the Trust 
Deed. 
4. All persons having an interest in the subject premises 
shall have the right, upon producing satisfactory proof of 
interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law for 
such redemption. From and after the expiration of the period of 
redemption as provided by law, all Defendants and each of them, and 
all persons claiming by, through, or under them, and any other 
person or entity, shall be forever barred and foreclosed of all 
right, title, interest, and estate in and to the subject premises 
and from and after the delivery of the Sheriff's Deed to the 
subject premises, the grantee named therein shall be given 
possession thereof. 
5. No deficiency judgment shall be hereafter awarded 
inasmuch as the obligors on the note have beeen released from 
liability or were otherwise discharged in bankruptcy. 
6. Defendant Faust Land, Inc., as current owner of the 
property in Tooele, is entitled to possession of the subject 
premises and all rights pertaining thereto during the period of 
redemption as provided by law. 
7* The Crossclaims of Defendants Overthrust and Faust Land, 
Inc., are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits as to 
Defendant Richard A. Christenson. 
8. As between Defendants Overthrust and Christenson, each 
party shall bear their own costs and fees herein. The issue of 
fees of Defendants Overthrust and Faust against Capitol Thrift & 
Loan under any subrogation claim is reserved for future 
determination by the Court. 
DATED this <S day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
y? 7^^-
omer F. Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
4 
U U 0 •'•* -i L 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
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:uce J, Nelson, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
torin N. Pace, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Overthrust 
and Faust Land, Inc. 
R. Stiphten Marshall, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
Capitol Thrift & Loan and 




PARCEL NO, 1: 
Northwest 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4, Northwest 1/4, Lots 2 and 3, 
Section 27, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
containing 249.86 acres; 
The part of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 17, Township 4 South, 
Range 5 West, lying southerly of Division Line, containing 10 
acres; 
That part of Section 21, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, lying southerly of Division Line, containing 480 acres; 
North 1/2 of the Northeast 1/4, Southeast 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4, 
Section 29, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
containing 120 acres; 
That part of Section 22, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, lying 
southerly of Division Line, containing 619.16 acres. 
North 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4, Northwest 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4, 
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
containing 120 acres; 
That part of the South 1/2, Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 5 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, lying south of Division Line, containing 
58.80 acres; 
North 1/2, Section 28, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, containing 320 acres. 
That part of the East 1/2, Section 20, Township 4 South, Range 5 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, lying southerly of Division Line, 
containing 310 acres. 
That part of the West 1/2 of the West 1/2, Section 14, Township 4 
South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian, lying southerly from 
Division Line, less 15 acres to Ana Conda containing 45 acres. 
Also that portion of the following described tracts lying Northerly 
from the Division Line particularly described as follows, and 
located in Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian: 
Beginning at the highest ridge line of the West Boundary of the 
Southwest 1/4 of the Southeast 1/4, Section 17 and running in a 
Southeasterly direction along said ridge line to a peak 
approximately in the center of Northeast 1/4 Section 21 which peak 
is shown on a map prepared by the U.S. Department of the Interior 
Geological Survey, covering Stockton, Utah, as being 6543 feet high 
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and running thence North 62°30f East 8976 feet, more or less, to 
a point on the East boundary of the West 1/2 of the West 1/2, 
Section 14 which final point is approximately on the East-West 
quarter section line, 
PARCEL NO. 2: 
North 1/2, Section 16, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, containing 320 acres. 
PARCEL NO. 3: 
South 1/2, Section 35, Township 6 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, containing 320 acres. 
PARCEL NO. 4: 
East 1/2 of the West 1/2 of Section 15, Township 8 South, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres. 
PARCEL NO. 5: 
East 1/2 of the Southwest 1/4, Northwest 1/4, Section 21, Township 
8 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 20 acres. 
PARCEL NO. 6: 
East 1/2 of the East 1/2, Section 9, Township 8 South, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres. 
PARCEL NO. 7: 
East 1/2 of the West 1/2, Section 12, Township 8 South, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres. 
PARCEL NO. 8: 
North 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 8, 
Township 6 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 2 0 
acres. 
PARCEL NO. 9: 
South 1/2, Section 36, Township 3 North, Range 11 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, containing 320 acres. 
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